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Abstract 
Twenty years after transition, the political sphere in Albania is becoming increasingly authoritarian 
despite the extensive development agendas promoted by many international organisations. This paper 
analyses the problems confronting civil society, one of the sacred pillars of democracy promotion, and 
the reasons it has been largely unable to facilitate early hopes of a democratic transformation. Three 
primary components converge to inhibit the impact civil society has so far been able to exercise on 
the political sphere: 1) The un-addressed legacy of a brutal totalitarian dictatorship; 2) the parallel, 
non-intersecting, distinctly gendered tracks along which civil society and government have developed; 
3) the complicity of international structures in inhibiting the deeply analytical culture of knowledge 
production necessary to shift the relation of the individual to the state. 
Keywords: Albania, civil society, democratisation, gender, nongovernmental organisations.
Introduction
While much of Southeast Europe has had difficulty developing democratic structures and processes, 
“Gallup Balkan monitor surveys have shown that Albania is the only country in the region where 
foreign institutions are seen as the most reliable, much more so than domestic, elected institutions” 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012, pp. 12-13). Seen as key to “fostering stability, security and respect for 
democracy and human rights,” the international organisations promoting a multi-party electoral 
system, rule of law, and economic privatisation have invested substantial sums in developing an 
effective civil society sector (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights [ODIHR], 2013, para. 
2).1 While the sector achieved limited progress through 2005, many of the advances made through 
NGO support from multi- and bi-lateral donors have been lost as donors shift funding agendas and 
withdraw from the country. According to the USAID sustainability index, democratic development 
in  Albania  has  in  fact  declined  over  the  last  several  years  in  many  key  areas  (including  in  the 
electoral process, national and local governance, and independent media) (United States Agency for 
International Development [USAID], 2011, 2012). Where it has not outright declined, it has remained 
1    There is much discussion about what civil society actually means as well as about the nature of the relation 
between a broadly conceived civil society and civil society organisation (CSOs), non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGOs), faith-based organisation (FBOs) and labour organisations. For the purposes of this paper – which 
remains interested in but does not engage a theoretical discussion of the nature of civil society and its relation 
to formal governmental structures – we are considering civil society as the broadest configuration of organised 
groups. Within Albania, we argue that civil society is functionally limited to non-governmental organisations 
funded by international donors and driven by the economic and crisis aid that has guided development during 
transition.
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stagnant, leading the European Commission (EC) in its 2010 and 2011 opinions on Albania’s progress 
towards EU membership to cite serious deficiencies in the “stability of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities” (Gjipali, 2011, 
p. 50).
This decline poses important questions for both international and domestic actors as we consider 
the future course of civil society development in Albania. Clearly, the strategies so far employed have 
not been sufficient to overcome the structural and technological deficiencies confronting the Albanian 
government and society in the wake of transition. In the first place, they have failed to sufficiently 
understand the emotional and psychological factors impeding individuals from developing informal 
social capital at the social and political levels (Polese, 2009). While a small group of the Albanian civil 
society sector has made important strides in advancing human rights and providing social services, 
these organisations are donor driven NGOs following funding agendas established by the large multi- 
and bi-lateral donors. Indeed, it is more appropriate to speak of the ‘NGO sector’ than of civil society 
in Albania, where the vast majority of organisations participating in the public sphere are “donor-
driven NGOs rather than genuinely local interest groups and grassroots movements in touch with 
local priorities” (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012, p. 14). 
The lack of a grass-roots civil society sector or initiatives coming from the bottom up point to the 
larger problems of Albania’s developmental history, which significantly differs in many respects from 
its SEE/ CEE neighbours, as well as how this history shapes current political crises. This paper analyses 
three particularly important factors inhibiting civil society development: 1) The un-addressed legacy 
of a brutal totalitarian dictatorship; 2) the parallel, non-intersecting, distinctly gendered tracks along 
which civil society and government have developed; 3) the complicity of international structures in 
inhibiting the deeply analytical culture of knowledge production necessary to shift the relation of the 
individual to the state. 
The first section, legacies of dictatorship, examines how attitudes and behaviours in Albania have 
been shaped by extreme oppression under a brutal totalitarian regime that left the country with 
few institutions, organisations, or intellectuals with a history of democratisation on which to draw. 
The second, third, and fourth sections deal with NGO development and decline. In the section on 
early NGO development and the state/ civil society divide, we examine how NGOs developed along 
a distinctly gendered, non-intersecting track parallel to the post-transition formation of political 
parties. Two subsequent sections map the growth and stabilisation period and the decline of civil 
society. Finally, we end with an analysis of international complicity in the problems confronting civil 
society. In certain respects, the structure of international aid, rather than helping Albanians overcome 
the many challenges facing them, has in fact been complicit in perpetuating divides. We conclude 
by arguing that, in order to overcome these problems, future strategies must facilitate a culture 
of knowledge production that can move from project implementation to the critical analysis and 
theoretical cultural debate necessary for a truly democratic civil society.
Legacies of dictatorship
As O’Brennan and Gassie (2009) argue, “Albania has faced problems of both nature and magnitude 
quite unlike anything experienced in neighbouring countries” (p. 65). While all of the countries in the 
region endured varying degrees of isolation and repression, Albanians were subject to extreme forms 
of these: they suffered the highest percentage of executions, imprisonment, and political exile, and 
the enduring effects of this continue to impact social and cultural development in Albania. Albania did 
not declare its independence until 1912, and shortly thereafter, like the rest of Europe and the Balkans, 
it lost years to the ravages of WWI, although neutral itself. In the interwar years, Albania experienced 
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industrial development and no development of forms of democratisation, labour or community-based 
organisation, or of a middle class (Krasniqi, 2012, para. 3–8). Repressive violence, both during and after 
WWII, further eroded the potential for pluralist socio-economic-political structures to evolve. The 
Partisans began wiping out political opposition during WWII and consolidated their power after the 
war through a series of brutal purges that effectively wiped out any remaining political opponents.
The  almost  total  absence  of  the  social  and  material  structures  that  might  support  political 
opposition converged with an exceptionally high degree of state terror to virtually eliminate the 
formation of a viable dissident movement.2 This is one of the most important factors generating what 
many call a unique communist mentality in Albania. As Krasniqi (2012) explains, without a dissident 
community or a legacy of democratic intellectual and cultural production inside the country,3 there 
was little possibility for effective civil opposition to the emerging state apparatus during the formative 
years of the communist regime.4 As this history indicates, the notion of ‘civil society’ did not exist 
as a concept in Albania. While strategic uses of informal social capital certainly helped individuals 
and families survive extreme repression (Polese, 2009), this social capital was family and clan based 
and not organised at a community level. Indeed, state laws criminalised the independent action of 
citisens in the public sphere. As informally organizing around any social issue was a criminal act, 
the very notion of civil society upon which development theory relies to build democratic structures 
today was, twenty years ago, criminal activity for which people would be labeled enemies of the state, 
exiled, or jailed (Krasniqi, 2012, para. 3-7).
After the 1985 death of Albania’s dictator, Enver Hoxha, criminal prosecutions relaxed somewhat 
under the government of Ramiz Alia, and by the early 90s student groups and a small cadre of 
the political elite rode the wave of the changes sweeping through the Soviet bloc and forced the 
government to accept political pluralism. However, with no conceptual frameworks and lacking any 
of the material or intellectual infrastructure with which to develop a political and economic system 
of pluralism and free markets, there was a great deal of emotional as well as intellectual opposition to 
changing the structures of a one-party totalitarian state. As Eglantina Gjermeni, formerly the Executive 
Director of the Gender Alliance for Development Center and currently a Member of Parliament for the 
Socialist Party, describes the situation:
2    Krasniqi (2012), citing data from The Black Books of Communism, estimates that as much as 18% of the total 
population was subject to direct and massive oppression, including imprisonment and exile (para. 4).
3    This point of knowledge production is crucial as it is a microcosm for the fragmented, oppositional history of 
knowledge production in the country. Albania did not have a university until 1957; when the University of Ti-
rana was finally inaugurated, the communist power structures had consolidated and the institution functioned 
exclusively as an arm of the state, with little possibility for catalysing critical analysis or intellectual opposition 
to the regime. Under the communist regime, the communist elite was educated in universities in Russia and 
southeastern Europe, as well as in western European countries under the umbrella of communist parties that 
maintained good relations with the Hoxha regime. The likelihood of an education abroad translating to dissi-
dence at home was largely prevented by the extensive surveillance networks monitoring Albanians’ movement 
and the threat to family members at home should those abroad show signs of free-thinking or dissent. Cur-
rently, the intellectual elite is still being educated outside of the country, primarily through Western initiatives 
for ‘development.’ Albania hence still lacks the intellectual as well as the material infrastructure inside of the 
country necessary for a culture of sophisticated knowledge production.
4    As early as 1946, a law forbade the establishment of any organisation independent of the party (where, in the 
one-party system, the communist party was the only instrument of government). Laws also forbade the forma-
tion of any contracts or economic cooperation with other states as well as the free movement both inside of the 
country and between countries. Political opposition through religious/ church organisations became increas-
ingly more impossible following the 1967 law criminalising religion; as part of a broad-ranging ‘cultural revo-
lution’ parallel to the cultural revolution of Albania’s then-ally communist China religious communities were 
outlawed, a series of purges carried out against the clergy, and all religious institutions closed. This effectively 
shut down any possibility of the churches functioning as a site for social organisation outside of governmental 
frameworks (Krasniqi, 2012, para. 3-7).10 Lori E. Amy & Eglantina Gjermeni
There was no basis from which civil society could develop. We started from scratch. The political 
parties were established on the same models of centralised power and control as the communist 
model – this is what the men organizing the new party system were trained in and it is what they 
repeated. Even the civil society organisations were not free from this – they had to establish from 
scratch something that did not exist before and they had few resources for establishing new ways 
of thinking, feeling, behaving. They were in the dilemma of trying to meet the new demands of 
the internationals who were providing money, training, and offering western models of political 
economy, but trapped in the mentality of the communist past.
Early NGO development and the state/ civil society divide
As with other SEE / CEE countries, after the fall of communism the government quickly withdrew from 
public and individual life.5 The large-scale dis-investment in the public sphere under the dictates of 
privatisation, especially in the realm of social services, left an enormous gap in which no institutions 
or  organisations  assumed  responsibility  for  defining  or  addressing  the  many  social  problems 
accompanying transition – domestic and family crises of internal migration and displacement, violence 
against women and children, human rights abuses, sexual violence and trafficking, the increased 
insecurity of the individual and family in states of emergency (such as the 1999 Kosovo war and civil 
crisis following the 1997 economic collapse). The void left by the state’s withdrawal from the public 
sphere was filled by the emerging NGO sector. NGOs developed, initially, through the women’s and 
human rights organisations trying to provide emergency and crisis relief to those who had suffered 
the worst human rights violations under communism as well as to the populations most vulnerable 
to the economic ravages of transition.
The divide between the emerging state and the newly forming civil society was immediately and 
distinctly gendered, and this bifurcation has been one of the obstacles limiting the impact of civil 
society on the emerging state.6 As Gjermeni, one of the first post-communist intellectuals trained 
outside of the country and an early front-runner in NGO development, describes it: “While the men 
were forming the political parties, women, who were responsible for the continuity of life, used 
the NGO sector to benefit and contribute to the development of society and culture.” Women were 
logically positioned to fill the gap left by the state’s withdrawal from the public sphere in the early 
days of neoliberal shock therapy, both because they suffered such high job losses and because the 
economic ravages of transition brought new social problems that had to be addressed. Most of the big 
factories that were administered by the communist state and that closed in transition had employed 
women,7 and the private sectors that dominated the new economy, such as construction, excluded 
5    For a more comprehensive analysis of social hardship in the Balkans, central, and southeast Europe, see Alexi 
Gugushvili (2011).
6    For a comparative look at gendered difference in the labour market in Baltic states, see Rein Vöörmann (2009).
7    The “immediate consequence of the economic transformation was a very sharp decline of production – output 
declined by about 50% between 1989 and 1992 while inflation rose to triple digit figures” (Hoxha et al., 2008, p. 
11). The “dismantling of several state owned companies and the privatisation process” slashed the number of 
jobs in the public sector from “850 thousand in 1991 to just 238,850 in 1996 and 175 thousand in 2005” (Hoxha 
et al., 2008, p. 24). A 2006 study by the International Labour Organisation shows that “the industrial sector 
(particularly extraction of minerals, metallurgy, equipment, chemicals, paper and textiles)” was the hardest hit, 
and that the “gap in employment between men and women has been increasing” in recent years (Fortuny, Gun-
dacker, Tomei, Kempf, and Roland, p. 19). At the same time, women lost ground in the political arena. “Whereas 
before the transition women were well represented politically on both the national and local level, they now 
find themselves pushed out of public life” (International Fund for Agricultural Development [IFAD], 2007, para. 2).Where is the ‘State’ in Albania? The Unresolved Contradictions Confronting Civil Society in the ‘Transition’ from 
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women (Hoxha, Jorgoni, Plaku, Agolli, Lama, Xhumari, Kalo, Gusmari, Muhedini, and Gjermeni, 2008).8 
Added to the exclusionary forces of the emerging market economy, women lost the childcare facilities 
formerly provided by the state as well as the educational infrastructure necessary for them and their 
children. Rapid unregulated privatisation was accompanied by the rise of criminal networks and the 
trafficking of women and children as well as the health and safety risks of unplanned urbanisation 
(such as problems with sanitation, clean water supply, and unregulated traffic that are the inevitable 
consequence of no urban planning). It was thus in the context of a political economy dominated 
by men and a market economy that brought massive unemployment with few opportunities for 
reeducation that women became key actors in the emerging NGO sector. 
Hence, there was a parallel development of political parties and NGOs, where the NGOs were 
concerned with maintenance of daily life and dominated by women, while political parties were 
dominated by men, intricately bound to international trade, and frequently linked to the organised 
criminal networks so integral to the emerging political economy. Assisted by the international agencies 
structuring development aid, the NGOs assumed primary responsibility for basic social services, health, 
and welfare resulting from the government’s withdrawal from the public sphere. Understandably, the 
first NGOs in the country focused on issues of human rights and cultural violence; in 1991, the Forum 
for Protecting the Foundational Human Rights of People was established, followed by the first Women’s 
organisation, the Independent Forum of Albanian Women (IFAW). By the end of 1991, an additional 
20 NGOs were established, primarily focusing on political and cultural development (Krasniqi, 2012, 
para. 9-18). In 1992, The Forum for Protecting Human Rights was recognised as a full member of the 
Helsinki Federation of Human Rights and re-named the Albanian Helsinki Committee. Other women’s 
organisations that formed in 1992 included Refleksione and the Albania Family Planning Association, 
followed by the Women’s Programme in the Open Society Foundation for Albania in 1994 and the 
Women’s Centre (later renamed the Gender Alliance for Development Centre) in 1995 (Xhillari, Çabiri, 
and Frangu, 2008, pp. 12-13).
Primarily women-led and focused on human rights and social services delivery, these NGOs struggled 
to adapt to a new order. In the early years, international organisations expended considerable time 
and money training NGO directors and staff in models and practices that had, until 1991, been not only 
alien to the culture but, in most cases, criminal. Understandably, then, NGOs had difficulty explaining 
the importance of their work to local communities, much less to the evolving political parties. Added 
to this, an extremely poor communications infrastructure (internet, telephone, fax) impeded their 
ability to effectively network or disseminate information, so that neither the population nor the 
government had a clear idea of what NGOs were operating in the country or what they were doing 
(Gjipali, 2011, p. 16). At the same time, the emerging NGOs did not have the skills or the infrastructure 
that would allow them to coordinate with one another. The government, meanwhile, was either 
openly antagonistic towards or dismissive of the emerging NGO sector. Moreover, the NGO emphases 
on social service work and humanitarian assistance of the poor, vulnerable, and exploited were (and 
remain) delegitimated by neoliberal economics that excise social services and prioritise capital. 
In short, NGO work was the work of homes, families, and children, NOT the work of politics and 
government. The problems posed by this development of civil society along a distinctly gendered, 
non-intersecting trajectory parallel to the state were somewhat obscured by the shift in the structure 
of international aid after the 1997 economic collapse, when the country lost over a billion dollars and 
nearly 2000 lives to pyramid schemes (Hoxha et al., 2008; USAID, 1998, 2011; World Bank, 2002; Gjipali, 
8    As Hoxha et al. note, “the low share of the employment in the construction industry” as compared to the con-
tribution to GDP reflects the “high level of informality of labour in this sector, which is believed to be one of the 
highest beside the informality in the trading sector” (2008, p. 14). While under-the-table work in the construc-
tion industry engages a “large share of the labour force and provides a survival income for many unemployed 
males,” it does not build the state apparatus to harness private sector growth to national development or 
improve the quality of life for sector employees (Hoxha et al., 2008, p. 14).12 Lori E. Amy & Eglantina Gjermeni
2011; Krasniqi, 2012). Rioting, looting, armed revolts, and the near total collapse of the government 
“alarmed the world and prompted intensive international mediation” (USAID, 2011, para. 12). A United 
Nations (UN) Multinational Protection Force restored order, and the major bilateral donors, including 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and USAID, met in October 1997 to consider 
an emergency aid program (USAID, 1998). Similarly, in 1999 when the war in Kosovo was flooding 
neighbouring countries with refugees, NGO development responded to the increased emphasis on 
humanitarian needs. Over 100 new NGOs were registered following the war, in partnership with 
internationals to deal with refugees and camp management, special needs of women and children, 
human rights violations, and de-mining (Krasniqi, 2012, para. 13-15). 
Increases in funding from bi- and multilateral donors to address regional security interests thus 
contributed to the growth and stabilisation period of NGO development (Krasniqi, 2012; Gjipali, 2011). 
Particularly important donors in this period included USAID, the Dutch organisations NOVIB, ICCO, 
HIVOS, Cordaid, and SNV, the UNDP, and the SOROS Foundation. Additionally, in 2002 the World 
Bank and the UK’s Department for International Development (DFiD) initiated the Social Services 
Delivery Project (SSDP); administered by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs via the General 
Agency of Social Services, the SSDP was designed as a “joint initiative between local government and 
NGOs” intended to implement long term joint projects (Xhillari et al., 2008, pp. 23-24). This influx of 
emergency and crisis aid allowed the more established NGOs to broaden their impact and reach and 
consolidate; as a consequence, they developed institutional and bureaucratic structures, including 
fiscal management and accountability, that were still seriously lacking in government.
The growth and stabilisation period
This shift in development and aid agendas following the Kosovo war and economic collapse helps 
to explain how a short period of apparent growth obscured the fault lines along which state and 
civil society evolved. Far from being inexplicable, the decline in the NGO sector following a period of 
growth and stabilisation is the logical, albeit delayed, consequence of the structures and processes 
through which the NGO sector formed. Immediately after transition, NGO work was, literally and 
figuratively, ‘women’s’ work, centred around women’s and human rights issues and social services. 
During this time, funding agencies devoted considerable resources to socialising the NGO elite into 
the discourses, genres, and norms of development. NGO training included English-language training, 
teaching aspiring civil-sector workers the genres and norms for writing grant proposals, and providing 
workshops  on  the  mechanisms  of  funding  (including  explaining  donors’  country  missions  and 
priorities, defining projects and matching projects to funding entities, training in project proposal 
development, and grant writing).9 By 1997, donors had begun to fund projects on NGO management, 
including how to run NGO boards and steering committees. Thus, by the time crisis aid flooded the 
country in 1997, the NGO elite had begun to form and was poised to capitalise on emergency aid and 
provide crisis relief. From 1997 – 2005, the NGO sector continued to build institutional and intellectual 
capacity, and, for a time, seemed as though it might in fact be a leading force in democratisation.
During this period – understood by Krasniqi (2012) as the third phase of civil society development 
and by Xhillari, Çabiri, and Frangu (2008) as the post-crisis stabilisation and maturation period10 –
9    Examples taken from a review of the annual reports (1995 – 2009) of one of the leading NGOs of the period, the 
Gender Alliance for Development Center (http://www.gadc.org.al/v2/).
10    Krasniqi argues that, in its first phase, civil society functions as individual/group initiatives critical towards the 
government; in the second phase, civil society organisations are important agents in the political sphere that, 
because they are not part of the political party structure, are not subject to the polarisation and divisiveness 
of the contested political domain; in the third (and, as Krasniqi admits, utopian phase), civil society becomes a 
mechanism to link government and the private sphere (2012). However, as Xhillari et al. (2008) point out, this 
post-2005 slippage differs on both the second and third phase criteria cited by Krasniqi (pp. 26-29). As the World 
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international organisations began emphasising policy and analysis and pressuring the government 
to begin capitalising on the intellectual and human capital of the NGO sector. A number of “new 
advocacy networks were created and advocacy actions increased” (Xhillari et al., 2008, p. 24). Efforts 
to combat corruption were a crucial component of this shift – over 100 anti-corruption NGOs were 
formed by 2001 (Krasniqi, 2012, para. 14). In 2002, the Citizens Advocacy Office (CAO) was established 
“with the aim of providing legal assistance to citizens facing pressure to engage in corruption by 
public officials” (Xhillari et al., 2008, p. 34), and in 2003 Mjaft, formed by the first group of young people 
educated outside of the country, brought new practices of community mobilisng and consciousness 
raising to civil society development (Krasniqi, 2012, para. 17). In addition to these developments, the 
Carter Center promoted a “broad based participation approach to civil society in the development of 
the national strategy” (Xhillari et al., 2008, p. 50), and some key NGOs shifted work from primarily 
seminars and training to concrete actions with participation of interest groups involving the general 
citizenry. For the first time, coalitions were formed for electoral monitoring, hearing sessions included 
NGOs in Parliament, and there were initiatives to partner government and civil society and include the 
intellectual capital from the NGO sector in drafting laws. 
These shifts from service delivery to policy formation seemed to poise the NGO sector to become 
an active force in the democratic development of the country. Between 2002 and 2005, international 
stakeholders and key donors strongly encouraged Albanian civil society to move from a focus on “the 
protection of civic, political, economic, social and cultural rights” and to prioritise, instead, “improving 
the quality of governance and its outcomes” (Xhillari et al., 2008, p. 23).11 Significantly, during this time 
key personnel from the NGO community were involved in task forces and working groups responsible 
for designing new laws as well as improving existing laws. Indeed, ministries worked collaboratively 
with NGOs to develop legislation on reproductive health, the law on NGO development, the family 
code, and the laws on domestic violence and gender equality (Krasniqi, 2012; Xhillari et al., 2008; 
Gjipaldi, 2011;Winship, 2004; GTZ, 2010).12 The NGO sector was also largely responsible for training (of 
policy makers, lawyers, advocates, media representatives, local government staff), media campaigns, 
and raising public awareness about the new laws. Indeed, NGO-led public awareness campaigns were 
especially important in mobilising community pressure on the government (Gjermeni, 2012; Krasniqi, 
2012).
The decline of civil society
Through  2005,  international  organisations  helped  to  forge  an  elite  cadre  of  NGO  workers  who 
conducted training, provided resources, and began creating the infrastructure with which to address 
serious social problems. Indeed, the NGO sector provided most of the social services available in the 
country – functions for which the state had previously been responsible – as well as a range of other 
‘cognitive’ functions necessary to the state.13 Crucially, performing this work required developing the 
intellectual capacity and administrative structures necessary to the functioning of a state, but this 
rating declined from “moderately satisfactory” to “moderately unsatisfactory” on the following registers: 
policy development, monitoring and administration of social services; community-based social services; and 
project management, information systems, and monitoring (Kostallari, 2012, p. 1).
11    Xhillari et al. (2008) argue that there are “four phases to the development” of Albania’s third sector: early tran-
sition (1991-1996); crisis period (1997-2001); post crisis and NGOs maturation period (2002-2005); NGO slippage 
period (2005-onwards) (p. 5).
12    However, even when the government has invited NGOs “to participate in strategy formulation,” their role has 
been “limited” (Xhillari et al., 2008, p. 50).
13    Chalmers (2001) argues that we need to better understand the complex interplay of political parties, civil so-
ciety actors, and international players in the cognitive processes of comprehension, reasoning, and decision 
making; this analysis of the “cognitive side of politics” is crucial for supporting civil society initiatives that 
actually contribute to democratisation (para. 5-9).14 Lori E. Amy & Eglantina Gjermeni
was something that the political parties, having abandoned the public sphere, ignored. However, the 
initiatives begun during this period did not, by and large, take root. Laws were not followed, policies 
were  ignored,  and  the  intellectual  resources  cultivated  by  international  training  and  education 
remained largely confined to an NGO sector that, despite some accomplishments, had overall little 
impact on formal governmental processes and structures. The sector seemed to function as long as 
international organisations were providing the road maps and funding for a core group of NGO elites 
to follow. As these structural supports were removed, the NGO sector lost much of the ground it had 
gained (Xhillari et al., 2008, pp. 26-29). 
By 2005, the NGO sector began to decline as the political sphere became increasingly authoritarian. 
A number of factors converged in this decline. First, reallocations of international aid had an adverse 
impact on the sector. “Important NGO financial supporters cut their funding,” including key Danish 
and Dutch organisations (Xhillari et al., 2008; GTZ, 2010; USAID, 2011; Krasniqi, 2012). The World Bank 
SSDP ended, and USAID shifted its funding priorities to government anti-corruption reforms.14 At the 
same time, the UNDP, the umbrella organisation for funding in the country, faced funding deficiencies 
from the limited number of bilateral donors operating in the country. The EU, “the largest development 
donor in Albania, did not fill the gap because of a diminished focus on civil society services,” and the 
Open Society Foundation for Albania (OSFA) funds decreased substantially as part of OSFA strategy for 
the region (Xhillari et al., 2008, p. 27).15 Organisations such as the Citizen’s Advocacy Office cut activist 
activity and shifted their focus to research, membership in the Albanian Coalition Against Corruption 
dropped by 70%, and internal friction either dissolved or seriously disrupted the work of many other 
organisations (Xhillari et al., 2008, p. 28).16
One of the most devastating factors impacting NGO functioning, though, was the fact that many 
of the activist and watchdog NGO leaders from the 2002 – 2005 growth period “became members of 
parliament or took high government positions, including ministerial positions” (Xhillari et al., 2008; 
Krasniqi, 2012; GTZ, 2010). Far from helping to transform government from within, civil society leaders 
who moved into government quickly accommodated to the rules of the game in the political sphere. 
The international community perceived the move of Western-educated civil society actors into the 
formal governmental structures as a positive development and failed to anticipate that the same 
people that had been trained in the concepts of ‘open society’ and ‘democratisation’ would become 
part of the political status quo. Given that today’s political parties function much as the Communist 
Party did in the totalitarian structure, though, appropriation into, rather than transformation of, 
existing power structures was virtually inevitable. Each party has one ‘leader’ who demands strict 
ideological conformity and absolute party loyalty, and party members can be expelled for challenges to 
the party leader. Once in a governmental position, strict loyalty to the party and its leader is enforced. 
Moreover,  civil  society  organisations  operate  on  the  same  principles  of  authoritarian  power 
exercised by the former regime. Most organisations also have a single ‘leader’, and when that leader 
moves into politics, s/he takes the NGO along (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012; Xhillari et al., 2008; Krasniqi, 
2012). Alternatively, should a leader depart for other reasons, the NGO often collapses. Hence, the 
14    Corruption remains a serious problem in Albania. Indeed, Mathesin (2003) argues that, in Albania, the state 
itself is captured by the collusion of political elites, business, and organised crime. The traditional anti-cor-
ruption policies attempting to reform public administration and public finance management have failed in 
Albania, as the political class lacks the will to trade profit from the status quo for democratic reform or the 
public good (p. 1).
15    In 2006, the Open Society Foundation (OSF) shifted its role from a primarily grant-making organisation to an 
operational structure, the Network of Open Society in Albania (NOSA) (http://www.soros.al/nosa/en/index.
htm). An 8-member coalition of NGOs, NOSA aimed to develop strategic vision, impact public policy, and sup-
port civic activism. While important, NOSA had limited effect. At the end of 2008, OSFA discontinued the NOSA 
scheme, focusing more on working with “strategic partners according to areas of specialisation as well as 
other civil society organisations at all levels” (Xhillari et al., 2008, p. 27).
16    Currently, there are 11 multilateral donors (accounting for 58% of foreigin aid) and 23 bilateral donors oper-
ating in Albania. The European Union and the World Bank are the two largest multilateral donors, and Italy, 
Germany, Japan, the United States and the Netherlands are the five largest bilateral donors (GTZ, 2010, p. 8).Where is the ‘State’ in Albania? The Unresolved Contradictions Confronting Civil Society in the ‘Transition’ from 
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post-2005 migration of NGO elites into political positions created the dual problems of, on the one 
hand, leaving a void in NGO leadership, and, on the other, allowing newly minted government officials 
to use their former NGOs as tools for their political parties and ambitions. 
This phenomenon has had especially destructive consequences for Albania’s research capacities. 
Roughly 70% of the research and policy NGOs were established between 1997 and 2001. After the 
political  chaos  of  the  1997  economic  collapse,  many  of  those  forced  out  of  politics  and  public 
administration went on to found think tank institutes. According to the Euclid Network’s Human 
Development Promotion Centre, by 2008, these institutes comprised “90% of Albania’s total research 
and policy institutions” (Xhillari et al., 2008, p. 22). Think tanks became, in effect, an extension of party 
politics: the research and analysis produced by think tanks is thus not only not independent and not 
available for public debate, but is, in fact, part of the propaganda machinery of the highly contentious 
political sphere. Indeed, “the open affiliation of many think tank leaders to political parties and 
their involvement in government bodies in 2005 was considered a contributing factor towards the 
weakening” of civil society in Albania (Xhillari et al., 2008, pp. 20-24). 
International complicity
These  historical  and  contextual  factors  point  to  the  impossible  demands  on  non-state  actors  to 
radically transform the structures and practices of the state, particularly when the old state apparatus 
maintains political power and informal capital is weak, confined to individual and family relations, 
and unable to organise at community levels or formalise into civic or political structures (Polese, 
2009). In the face of escalating political crisis17 and a deteriorating NGO sector, the legacy of brutal 
dictatorship  and  the  fault  lines  along  which  governmental  and  nongovernmental  organisations 
developed are increasingly apparent. However, Albania’s political, social, and economic situation has 
not evolved in a vacuum in these twenty years of transition. In fact, the structure of international aid 
exacerbates some of the conditions obstructing the effective development of civil society. 
Chief among these structural problems is the short-term nature of project cycles in the donor-
driven sector. Those NGOs that are in fact working on behalf of democratisation (and not as an arm 
of a political party) devote substantial intellectual resources to responding to requests for proposals, 
understanding international funding priorities and country agendas, and shaping projects that fit 
the agendas of specific donor organisations. Indeed, the 1991 – 1997 socialisation period trained the 
NGO elite in precisely these tactics. NGOs capable of targeting the current fashion in funding receive 
more project grants and grow an institutional capacity centred on donor agendas. Moreover, donor 
dependency pits NGOs against each other in a battle to win projects. Because NGOs exist only by 
virtue of winning funding, they have to closely guard ideas (otherwise they risk giving fundable ideas 
to other organisations and so lose in the project competition). Hence, the intellectual resources of 
17    The always deeply divided and sometimes violently contentious political sphere has increasingly escalated 
into a state of crisis following the 2009 parliamentary elections; the opposition Socialist Party (SP) lodged a 6 
month boycott in protest of election fraud by the ruling Democratic Party (DP) – a political strategy of shut-
ting down the government also employed by the DP in previous years. In February 2010, the SP established a 
“conditional relation with the parliament /.../ resulting in their absence from voting on laws until the issue of 
the election’s transparency was settled. The legislative agenda was heavily affected by this situation, and no 
laws or appointments of high state officials requiring a qualified majority were approved” (Gjipali, 2011, p. 50). 
This situation has once again left the country deadlocked in a struggle for power that offers no checks on the 
rampant corruption pervading every sector of society (including ruling and opposition party power structures). 
A “dangerous radicalisation between opposition parties” intensified after 4 people were killed in a January 2011 
protest of government corruption. With a “weak rule of law and consolidation of a culture of impunity,” Alba-
nia has seriously declined “in most measures of political participation, the stability of democratic institutions 
and political and social integration” (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012, p. 2). For a more comprehensive analysis of 
problems developing effective rule of law in post-communist countries, see Michael Hein (2011).16 Lori E. Amy & Eglantina Gjermeni
the NGO sector remain divided and not able to effectively collaborate. Instead of being able to use 
their understanding of social issues to define problems, creatively design collaborative projects and 
intervention strategies, grow coalitions, and evolve sustainable long-term projects, the NGO elite 
are compelled to compete against each other in a perpetual cycle of writing grants to fund short-
term projects (generally, product-oriented projects are funded for only one – three years), and writing 
annual reports justifying their use of donor money.18
This has serious consequences on two registers. In addition to projects not being sustainable 
(both because of limitations on what kinds of services and activities can be funded and because 
funding is for short periods of time), chasing short-term project money stymies creative intellectual 
development. Development agendas do not cultivate the critical intellectual capacity to analyse, much 
less reconcile, the conflicts between the old communist paradigms still governing the political sphere 
and the nascent ‘democratic’/market paradigms the country is expected to adopt. Moreover, funding 
formulas impede rather than facilitate collaboration amongst NGOs on long-term projects designed 
to incorporate multiple stakeholders and evolve over time. Under these circumstances, how could the 
NGO elite moving into the political sphere possibly be expected to change the structure of political 
power into which they and the NGOs they had been running were inevitably absorbed? Trained only 
in  short-term,  other-directed  project  cycles,  unable  to  coordinate  long-term  plans  with  multiple 
stakeholders, and operating from a partial, fragmented knowledge base, how were they to exercise 
any real transformational effect? Structurally, they followed a logically consistent path from NGO 
management to political status quo, now part of the problem rather than the solution. 
Furthermore, the report-writing genre required in the game of chasing project funding traps 
people into reciting data and outcomes for the donor agency. In other words, knowledge production 
is severely circumscribed: data reporting, outcomes, and conclusions are written primarily for the 
funding  agency  and  circulated  primarily  through  project-specific  conferences,  workshops,  and 
training venues. Given that in Albania virtually all ‘research’ is conducted through NGOs – not, as is 
more typically the case in the countries overseeing ‘development,’ through university or academic 
institutions – NGO project work comprises the core ‘research’ base in the country. As previously 
discussed, much of this research is blatantly partisan and fuels destructive political divides. Those 
who genuinely want to engage in serious research thus have extremely limited opportunities for 
building broad-based intellectual networks through which to develop, disseminate, and evolve their 
research: they lack a critically engaged home-based network, and, as NGO workers producing reports 
for donor organisations, they have few outlets for engaging with an international academic audience. 
This inhibits their ability to produce the deep analysis and interpretation necessary for designing long-
term, sustainable projects.
These  problems  are  mirrored  in  the  lack  of  donor  coordination  amongst  the  international 
organisations  funding  NGO  work.  Effectively  coordinating  multi-  and  bilateral  project  funding 
requires that analysts within donor organisations know the history of funded projects in their priority 
areas and design funding priorities that build off of prior successful projects so as to grow long-term, 
sustainable initiatives that evolve from projects to effective structures, systems, and practices. In order 
to do this, international organisations must cooperate amongst themselves to share information and 
analyse effectiveness. Currently, such practices are the exception rather than the rule. What’s more, 
turf battles and ideological splits between donor organisations often result in project overlap and 
18    In 2008, of the 1,620 NGOs registered, only 365 were active (Krasniqi, 2012, para. 11); currently, only a few of the 
active NGOs have sound financial management plans (GTZ, 2010, p. 7). There are few mechanisms for helping 
even the best-functioning of NGOs to build sustainability (with, for example, training in forming partnerships 
with businesses, seeking alternative funding sources, or seriously facilitating the governmental and nongov-
ernmental cooperation that would bring the expertise, best practices, and intellectual capital of the NGO sec-
tor to the governmental sector (Ekonomi, Gjermeni, Danaj, Lula, and Beci, 2006; Gjipali, 2011; Krasniqi, 2012; 
Sadiku, 2010).Where is the ‘State’ in Albania? The Unresolved Contradictions Confronting Civil Society in the ‘Transition’ from 
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redundancy as well as gaps in identifying needed projects (Mathesin, 2003; GTZ, 2010; Xhillari et al., 
2008). The international community thus confronts internal obstacles in its effort to strategically 
evolve the NGO sector from donor-dependency to institutionalised and autonomous entities. 
Contradictions, fragmentation, and the need for a culture of  
knowledge production
Given these circumstances, many analysts question not just the present but also the future of Albania’s 
civil society. Unfortunately, the problems we have outlined – the legacy of brutal dictatorship, the 
effects of an early divide between the governmental and nongovernmental sectors and the mutually 
hostile relations between them, the complicity of international structures in inhibiting the analytical 
frameworks necessary for shifting the relation of the individual to the state – remain pervasive. 
Albania is not alone in being disappointed in the ability of civil society to bring about democratic 
governments. As Kim Scheppele (2013) argues, authoritarianism is on the rise in south-eastern Europe 
(as in many other parts of the world). This forces us to reconsider how Western notions of civil society 
are applied in contemporary development theory. Indeed, Paffenholz and Spurk (2006) argue that “civil 
society has been an almost purely Western concept historically tied to the political emancipation of 
citizens from former feudalistic ties, monarchy and the state during the 18th and 19th century,” and 
there is still debate as to whether these concepts are “transferable to non-Western countries or other 
historical contexts with different levels of democracy and economic structures” (pp. 4-5).
While a sustained critique of the centrality of ‘civil society’ to development theory is beyond the 
scope of this paper, we do maintain that the progressive weakening of democratic processes and 
structures in Albania challenges us to confront the contradictions of, on the one hand, training the 
NGO elite to follow shock therapy development agendas in the early 1990s and, on the other, expecting 
them to transform the authoritarian governments that evolved through transition. In the first years 
of transition, neo-liberal development models absolved the state of responsibility for social services 
and  welfare  (including  education,  health,  sanitation,  water  supply,  food  quality  and  assurance, 
telecommunications, ‘soft’ services for children, minorities, and social ‘protection’) (Mitlin, Hickey, 
& Bebbington, 2006). NGOs were asked to step in and fill the void in social services left by the state’s 
withdrawal, and in order to do this they substituted the ideological framework of development for 
the ideological framework of the communist state. They were not asked to critique the development 
models guiding transition. Indeed, to be winners in the cycles of project competition, they had to be 
advocates of the same economic policies that have left so many unemployed, homeless, and hopeless. 
To stretch this point a bit, in many ways the imposition of ‘civil society’ agendas in the service of 
free-market ideologies (where ‘free market’ is not synonymous with democracy) simply substitutes 
one ideological dictate for another, structuring people to continue using the survival strategies with 
which they endured communism in the (sometimes brutal) struggle to survive transition. As Gil Eyal 
(2004) argues in his analysis of communist psychology, “to be a communist subject meant to conduct 
a double life of dissimulation, to say things one does not mean and be silent about certain things 
that were unmentionable; to do certain things as pure meaningless ritual” (p. 22). To the extent 
that the structure of international development invokes similar responses – positioning people to 
say what funders want to hear, to adopt donors’ agendas so as to compete for scarce resources – it 
rescripts the dynamics of social and political life under authoritarian rule and represses the creative 
and intellectual energy necessary for shifting the relation of the individual to state necessary for a 
truly democratic political sphere. 
Today, shifts in aid funding and benchmark requirements for European Union integration demand 
that the state take back the responsibilities that it had been allowed to ignore. Civil society is now 
given the impossible task of altering the fundamental structures of a state in which the government 18 Lori E. Amy & Eglantina Gjermeni
has become increasingly authoritarian. That is, NGOs are being asked to collaborate with government 
to design social services, coordinate programs, and develop laws – an impossible demand given the 
political landscape in which NGOs operate. What’s more, civil society is held partially responsible 
for this increasing authoritarianism, under the assumption that, had civil society been ‘working,’ 
the government would have become ‘democratic.’ Given that the government has evolved through a 
complex intertwined relation with multiple international stakeholders, this is an excessive burden for 
civil society to shoulder. 
We are challenged, therefore, to rethink the strategies employed by development organisations for 
cultivating civil society. In the face of shifts in international funding priorities and a highly polarised 
political sphere, civil society workers have to overcome fragmentation, competition, and cycles of 
chasing money for short-term, unsustainable projects – impediments imposed upon them in part 
through the structure of international aid and global security agendas. We believe this is possible 
– there is a critical mass of social and intellectual capital that has been working in the NGO sector 
in Albania that may yet be able to effectively organise to tackle some of the most pressing social 
and poltical problems the country faces. However, as we have argued, significant structural and 
conceptual obstacles continue to prevent these potential allies from being able to effectively coalesce 
into organisations and institutions that can conceptualise, coordinate, and implement long-term 
sustainable solutions to the problems confronting political, social, and economic development.
In order to overcome these obstacles, international agendas have to be as concerned with facilitating 
a culture of critical analysis and knowledge production as they are with project implementation.19 As 
Chalmers argues (2001), “most of the civil society organisations and groups that play an important 
role” do so, not simply by proposing an idea, but, rather, by participating in the “structuring” of “ever 
changing ideas” (para. 9). As we have argued, development strategies that focus exclusively on project 
implementation limit possibilities for cultivating the intellectual forces in civil society that can inspire 
a real paradigm shift in the political sphere. It is, rather, the “process of gathering information and 
participating in the many analytical, information and theory driven debates, discussions, researches, 
explorations and investigations going on in the political process” that promotes a democratic civil 
society (Chalmers, 2001, para. 9). 
References
Albanian  Helsinki  Committee.  (2001).  History.  Retrieved  from  http://www.ahc.org.al/site/indexok.
php?lang=EN&mid=19
Amy,  L.  (2010).  Re-membering  in  transition:  The  trans-national  stakes  of  violence  and  denial  in  post-
communist Albania. History of Communism in Europe, Politics of Memory in Post-Communist Europe, 1, 
205-222. 
Bertelsmann Stiftung. (2012). BTI 2012 – Albania country report. Gütersloh, Germany: Author. Retrieved from 
http://www.bti-project.de/fileadmin/Inhalte/reports/2012/pdf/BTI%202012%20Albania.pdf 
Chalmers, D. (2001, September). How do civil society associations promote deliberative democracy? Paper 
presented at the Latin American Studies Association Conference, Washington DC, USA. Retrieved from 
http://www.columbia.edu/~chalmers/Chalmers_LASA.htm
19    For a more detailed analysis of the forces of denial and international complicity constraining knowledge pro-
duction in Albania, see Lori Amy (2010).Where is the ‘State’ in Albania? The Unresolved Contradictions Confronting Civil Society in the ‘Transition’ from 
Communism to Free Markets
19
Ekonomi, M., Gjermeni, E., Danaj, E., Lula, E., & Beci. L. (2006). Creating economic opportunities for women in 
Albania: A strategy for the prevention of human trafficking. Tirana, Albania: United Nations Development 
Fund for Women. Retrieved from http://www.unifem.sk/uploads/doc/Albania%20report%20final.pdf
European Commission. (2006). Expanding on the proposals contained in the communication to the European 
Parliament and the Council on ‘strengthening the ENP’: Strengthening the civil society dimension of the 
ENP (COM 2006 726 final). Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/non-paper_civil-society-
dimension_en.pdf
European Commission. (2011). Albania 2011 progress report, (SEC (2011) 1205 final). Retrieved from http://
ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/al_rapport_2011_en.pdf
European Commission (2013). The policy: How does the neighbourhood policy work? European neighbourhood 
policy. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/howitworks_en.htm
Eyal, G. (2004). Identity and trauma: Two forms of the will to memory. History & Memory, 16(1), 5-36.
Fortuny, M., Gundacker, F., Tomei, M., Kempf, F., & Roland, D. (2006). Employment policy review: Albania. 
International Labour Organization and the Council of Europe. Available from the Directorate General of 
Social Cohesion, Social Policy Department.
Gjipali, G. (2011). Nations in transit 2011: Albania.Washington, DC: Freedom House. Retrieved from http://
www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/NIT-2011-Albania.pdf 
German Technical Cooperation. (2010). Strengthening civil society and democratic structures in Albania: Lessons 
learnt. Retrieved from http://www.gtz.de/en/dokumente/en-civil-society-democratic-structures-albania.pdf
Gugushvili, A. (2011). Material deprivation, social class and life course in the Balkans, Eastern Europe, and 
Central Asia. Studies of Transition States and Societies, 3(1), 39-54. Retrieved from http://www.tlu.ee/stss/
wp-content/uploads/2011/06/vol3-issue-1-gugushvili.pdf
Hein,  M.  (2011).  Constitutional  conflicts  between  politics  and  law  in  transition  societies:  A  systems-
theoretical approach. Studies of Transition States and Societies, 3(1), 3-23. Retrieved from http://www.tlu.
ee/stss/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/vol3-issue-1-hein.pdf
Hoxha, A., Jorgoni, E., Plaku, A., Agolli, M., Lama, A., Xhumari, M., Kalo, I., Gusmari, V., Muhedini, E., & 
Gjermeni,  E.  (2008).  Social  inclusion  and  social  protection  in  Albania.  Brussels,  Belgium:  European 
Commission, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs, and Equal Opportunities. Retrieved 
from http://www.feantsa.org/files/press_and_communication/albania_study_en.pdf
Institute for Development Research and Alternatives. (2008). Corruption in Albania: Perception and experience. 
Survey 2008 summary of findings. Tirana, Albania: Author. Retrieved from http://www.idra-al.org/cs2009/
Corruption%20in%20Albania%202009%20-%20Summary%20of%20Findings.pdf
International Fund for Agricultural Development. (2007). Gender trends in transitional economies in central, 
eastern Europe and newly independent states. Retrieved from http://www.ifad.org/english/gender/cen/
Jarvis, C. (2000). The rise and fall of Albania’s pyramid schemes. International Monetary Fund’s Finance and 
Development, 37(1). Retrieved from http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2000/03/jarvis.htm
Kostallari, L. (2012). Implementation status and results report: Albania social services and delivery project. 
Washington,  DC:  World  Bank.  Retrieved  from  http://ww-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/
WDSContentServer/WDSP/ECA/2012/01/02/D1844CF029D151B5852579790063DEF5/1_0/Rendered/PDF/
P0553830ISR0Di002201201325527851372.pdf
Krasniqi, A. (2012). Albania ‘civil’ – an infinite history of transition. Unpublished manuscript. University Revista 
Illyrus, Albania.
Mathesin, H. E. (2003). Donor roles in face of endemic corruption – Albania in the policy debate. Bergen, 
Norway:  U4  Anti-Corruption  Resource  Centre  Retrieved  from  http://www.cmi.no/publications/
publication/?2961=donor-roles-in-face-of-endemic-corruption-albania
Mitlin, D., Hickey, S., & Bebbington, A. (2006). Reclaiming development: NGOs and the challenge of alternatives. 
Oxford, UK: Global Poverty Research Group. Retrieved from http://economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk/14040/1/gprg-
wps-043.pdf20 Lori E. Amy & Eglantina Gjermeni
O’Brennan, J., & Gassie, E. (2009). From stabilization to consolidation: Albanian state capacity and adaptation 
to European Union rules. Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 11(1), 61-82. 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe. (n.d.). Supporting civil society. Retrieved May 29, 2013, from http://www.osce.org/odihr/44461 
Paffenholz, T. & Spurk, C. (2006). Civil society, civic engagement, and peacebuilding (World Bank Social Develop-
ment Papers: Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction. Paper No. 36). Retrieved from http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/INTCPR/Resources/WP36_web.pdf
Polese, A. (2008). ‘If I receive it, it is a gift; if I demand it, then it is a bribe’: On the local meaning of economic 
transactions in post-soviet Ukraine. Anthropology in Action, 15(3), 47-60.
Polese, A. (2009). Ukraine 2004: Informal networks, transformation of social capital and coloured revolutions. 
Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 25(2-3), 255-277.
Raik, K. (2006). Promoting democracy through civil society: How to step up the EU’s policy towards the eastern 
neighbourhood (CEPS Working Documents, EU Foreign Policy) . Retrieved from http://www.ceps.eu/book/
promoting-democracy-through-civil-society-how-step-eus-policy-towards-eastern-neighbourhood
Sadiku, L. (2010). Civil society against corruption. Retrieved from http://www.againstcorruption.eu/uploads/
rapoarte_finale_PDF/Albania.pdf
Scheppele, K. L. (2013, Winter). Not your father’s authoritarianism: The creation of the ‘Frankenstate.’ 
American Political Science Association’s European Politics and Society Newsletter, 5-9.
Technical Assistance for Civil Society Organizations. (2012, July). Interview with Mr. Rudi Bobrati, Director of 
Civil Society Support Agency. Retrieved from http://www.tacso.org/doc/Newsletter,%20Volume%201,%20
Issue%202,%20Albania.pdf
Winship, J. (2004, February). Annual report on best practices, lessons learned and success stories: illustrations 
from  Albania,  Guatemala  and  Southern  Africa.  (Study  Commissioned  from  Chemonics  International 
Inc. and Development and Training Services, Inc., Women in Development IQC Women’s Legal Rights 
Initiative, contract No. GEW-I-00-02-00016-00, by the Office of Women in Development U.S. Agency for 
Inter  national Development). Retrieved from http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACW794.pdf
United  States  Agency  for  International  Development.  (2011).  2010  NGO  sustainability  index  for  Central 
and Eastern Europe and Eurasia. Bureau for Europe and Eurasia Office of Democracy, Governance and 
Social Transition, 20-26. Available from http://transition.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/dem_gov/
ngoindex/
United States Agency for International Development. (2012). The 2011 CSO sustainability index for Central and 
Eastern Europe and Eurasia. United States Agency for International Development Bureau for Europe and 
Eurasia Office of Democracy, Governance and Social Transition. Retrieved from http://transition.usaid.
gov/locations/europe_eurasia/dem_gov/ngoindex/reports/2011/2011CSOSI_Index_complete.pdf#page=23
United States Agency for International Development Albania. (1998). Strategic plan FY 1998-2002. Retrieved 
from http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACC491.pdf
Vöörmann, R. (2009). Gender segregated labour markets in the Baltics: What are prevailing-similarities or 
differences? Studies in Transition States and Societies, 1(1), 66-80. Retrieved from http://htk.tlu.ee/stss/wp-
content/uploads/2009/11/STSS_voormann.pdf
Xhillari, L, Çabiri, Y., & Frangu, A. (2008). Third sector development in Albania: Challenges and opportunities. 
London, UK: Euclid Network. Retrieved from http://www.euclidnetwork.eu/data/files/albania.pdf
Zickel, R. & Iwaskiw, W.R. (1994). Albania: A country study. Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. 
(2nd. Edition). (LC Control no. 93042885). Retrieved from http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/altoc.htmlWhere is the ‘State’ in Albania? The Unresolved Contradictions Confronting Civil Society in the ‘Transition’ from 
Communism to Free Markets
21
Lori  Amy  is  Professor  of  Writing  and  Linguistics  at  Georgia  Southern  University  with  research 
specialisations in narrative, memory, and trauma studies. She is the author of The Wars We Inherit: 
Military Life, Gender Violence, and Memory and is currently researching a book on traumatic memory 
and identity in Albania.
Eglantina Gjermeni is Assistant Professor of Social Work in the Faculty of Social Sciences and a Member 
of Parliament for the Socialist Party in Albania. She has served as the Executive Director for the Gender 
Alliance for Development Center as well as a consultant for many international organisations.
Acknowledgements
Research for this article was carried out in part through a 2009 – 2010 Fulbright Scholars grant and 
short-term travel awards and language grants from the National Council of East European and Eurasian 
Research and the American Council of Learned Societies. The authors are particularly indebted to the 
many people in civil society that granted interviews and provided insight for this work. 